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The end of the Cold-War has influenced Japanese and United States (U.S.)
defense forces in many respects. Plans for the reduction of the U.S. military
have started to take shape. The U.S. Department of Defense publication, "A
Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st
Century," outlines the rearrangement of U.S. military forces. These changes,
in turn, are expected to influence the future role of Pacific Rim allies, in
particular, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze "external and internal factors
shaping the JMSDF."
The primary research questions are: "Does JMSDF have the financial
resources to improve its forces in the future?" And "What has been and will be
the level of complementarity between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy?"
C. FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
1. Outline
There are four parts to this thesis. The first part provides
background information and an introduction to this research. The second part
examines and analyzes the JMSDF's financial resources for improving its
forces. The third part examines and analyzes the level of complementarity
between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy. The final part presents findings and
conclusions.
2. Methodology
Data on Japan's national budget, the JMSDF budget, the procurement
prices of ships and aircraft, and other information was collected from the
Japan Maritime Staff Office in Tokyo. This data was mainly used to conduct
analysis as described in the second part of this thesis. Jane's Fighting Ships
and Aircraft, 1992-93, data and data from "The Military Balance 1992-1993" (The
International Institute for Strategic Studies) were used to conduct a simple
statistical comparison in the third part.
3. Scope
Internal factors refer to Japanese domestic matters and external
factors refer to matters outside of Japan. In this thesis I examined budgetary
matters as one of the internal factors and the relationship between the JMSDF
and the U.S. Navy as one of the external factors, because I judged that these
factors were the most fundamental factors shaping the JMSDF. Therefore I
didn't deal with other internal factors such as Japan's Consitution or other
external factors such as Japan's relations with East Asian countries.
II. RESOURCES FOR JMSDF IMPROVEMENT
A. OUTLINE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE PROGRAM
The defense policy Japan pursues under its constitution is based on the
"Basic Policy for National Defense" (see Appendix A) adopted by the National
Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in May 1957. Since 1957, defense
buildup plans were put into effect based on this basic policy. Table 1 shows a
history and outline of Japan's Defense Program.
At first in order to implement its basic policy, Japan put four Defense
Buildup Plans into effect. These plans all stressed the importance of
improving the fighting capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
and preparing the military for potential crises (see Appendix B).
With the completion of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan in FY 1976, the
"National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)" was adopted by the National
Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in October 1976.
"The NDPO is based on the concept of basic defense capability. The basic
defense capability is aimed at enabling the country to be fully on the alert in
peacetime and to effectively counter any limited and small-scale act of
aggression."^
"Since the NDPO was adopted by the Cabinet, the Government has ceased to
formulate defense buildup plans covering a fixed period of time as it did
before. Instead, it was decided to adopt mainly the so-called 'single fiscal-year
^Defense of Japan 1991 (Japan Defense Agency) p80
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formula' by which a necessary decision is made annually. "^ Unlike a series of
previous Defense Buildup Plans, the estimated total expenditures required to
implement the programs were not specified. "There was also a need to reflect a
public mood for tighter restrictions on a defense budget that had increased
17.7% in 1970 to 21% in 1975." 3 On October 5, 1976, the government decided on
a "Defense Buildup for the Time Being," in which placing a ceiling on defense
expenditures of 1% of GNP (the so-called framework of 1 percent of GNP) was
instituted.
In September 1985, the government formulated the Mid-Term Defense
Program to be implemented during the period from FY1986 through FY1990.
This was elevated to the status of government plan by subjecting mid-term
estimates by the Defense Agency to National Security Council debates for the
purpose of ensuring tighter civilian control.
In the process of the compilation of the FY1987 budget, it became certain
that defense expenditures exceeded 1% of GNP. Through heated discussions
among political parties, the Cabinet finally decided to discard the framework of
1 percent of GNP. Due to a need for a new limit instead of the framework of 1
percent of GNP, in January 1987, the "Defense Buildup for the Future" plan was
adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet (see Appendix C).
With the completion of the Mid-Term Defense Program in FY 1990, the
"Basic Policy on Defense Planning in and after FY1991" was adopted by the
National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 1990.
This Policy stated that "The decision was based on the judgment that a trend
^Defense of Japan 1982 (Japan Defense Agency) pi 10
^Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma (Harrison M. Holland) p49
toward the stability of international relations, on the premise of which the
NDPO was formulated, is currently emerging in a more advanced form—and
that it is appropriate to continue efforts for defense buildup in line with the
basic concept of the NDPO."4 In accordance with this judgment, on December
20, 1990, the government formulated the Mid-Term Defense Program to be
implemented during the period from FY1991 through FY1995.
B. JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
1. Trends in Defense Expenditures
From Figure 1, the ratio of the Defense Expenditures to GNP has been
under 1 percent of GNP since FY1967 except in FY1987 through FY1989. The
ratios in FY1987 through FY1989 were 1.004, 1.013, and 1.006 percent of GNP
respectively (see Appendix D). Defense expenditures to GNP increased during
the 1980's and decreased since FY1990.
With respect to the ratio of defense expenditures to national budget,
the ratio decreased from a high of 11.32% in FY1958 to 5.13% in FY1981, from
FY1981 to FY1988 the ratio increased to 6.53% then turned down again till
FY1991 settling at 6.3% in FY1992.
^Defense of Japan 1991 (Japan Defense Agency) p95
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Figure 1
Trend in Japan's Defense Expenditure(DE)/GNP & DE/Budget
In comparison to the growth rate from previous fiscal years of other
major budget items (Social Welfare, Education and Science, and Public Works),
the growth rate of the defense expenditure for the first time exceeded those of
other major budget items. This continued till FY1989 (see Figure 2 and
Appendix E). From FY1982 through FY1988 the growth rate of the defense
expenditures exceeded the entire budget. We can see here a clear shift of
















Note: This chart is expressed in real Yens, based on FY1985 prices and a FY1985 deflator.
Figure 2
Growth Rate in Major Account Expenditures
In comparison to the defense expenditures of other countries,
Japan's defense expenditures have been increasing steadily year by year (see
Figure 3). United States' defense expenditures declined slightly year by year
since 1987. Soviet Union's defense expenditures declined substantially in 1989
and China's defense expenditures have been constant or slightly declining
during the 1980's.
2. Trends in Defense Expenditures Classified by Expenses
Figure 4 shows the trend in Japan's Defense Expenditures classified
by expenses (personnel and provisions, current-year obligatory outlay, and
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Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1 989 prices and using a 1 989
deflator. Japan's defense expenditures (local currency) are expressed in Yens, based on
FY1985 prices and using a FY1985 deflator.





pay and meals for JSDF personnel. Current-year obligatory outlays are
expenses of contract authorization and expenses for continued projects
already approved by the Diet by the preceding fiscal year. Current-year
materials expenses are payable in the current fiscal year for the repair and
improvement of equipment, for purchase of oil, for the education and training
of JSDF personnel and for the procurement of new equipment. From Figure 4
one can see that the growth rate from previous years of current-year
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Note: This chart is expressed in real Yens, based on FY 1985 prices and a FY1985 deflator.
Figure 4
Trends in Japan's defense Expenditures (by Expenses)
Figure 5 shows the share trend in Defense Expenditures classified by
expenses. From this figure one can see that the share of current-year
obligatory outlays has been increasing year by year since FY1979. On the
10
other hand, the shares of personnel and provisions expenses and current-year
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Figure 5
Trends in Japan's Defense Expenditures (By Expenses)
3. Trends in Defense Expenditures classified by Organization
Figure 6 shows the trends of the Service budgets since FY1974 and
Figure 7 shows their share trends. Figure 6 shows steady budget growth for
each Service. From Figure 7, in recent years the budget share of the JGSDF has
been about 35% of the entire Defense Expenditure. It has decreased by 5%
from what it was in FY1980. About 25% of Defense Expenditures is the JMSDF











Note: JGSDF: Japan Ground Sett-Defense Force
JMSDF: Japan Maritime Serf-Detense Force
JASDF: Japan Air Self-Detense Force
Others includes DFAA and Security
Council.
DFAA: Detense Facility Administration
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Fiscal Year
Note: This chart is expressed in Yens, based on FY1985 prices and using a FY1985 deflator.
Figure 6


















Share Trends in Japan's Defense Expenditures
(by Organization)
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When we look into the ratio of each Service's budget to GNP, we can
see the difference between data before FY1981 and data after FY1982. Table 2
shows the average ratio of each Service budget to GNP (also see Appendix H).





JGSDF 0.36% 0.36% 0%
JMSDF 0.19% 0.24% 0.05%
JASDF 0.21% 0.25% 0.04%
The increase of Japan's Defense Expenditures compared to GNP
during the 1980's was caused by increases in the JMSDF and JASDF budgets.
4. JMSDF Budget
As stated above, the JMSDF budget is approximately 25 percent of the
entire defense budget. Figure 8 shows the share trend in the JMSDF budget
classified by expenses (personnel and provisions, current-year obligatory
outlays, and current-year materials) (see Appendix I). Figure 9 shows the
share trend in the JMSDF budget classified by three components, that is,
personnel and provisions, front-line, and others. Front-line expenses are
outlays for the procurement of ships and aircraft, etc. From Figures 8 and 10,
since the late 1970's current-year obligatory outlay expenses and front-line
expenses are larger compared to other expenses of the JMSDF budget. The
priority of the JMSDF budget was set for shipbuilding expenses and aircraft
procurement expenses (see Figure 10 and Appendix J).
13
We will find this change more clearly, when we look into the
modernization of ships and aircraft later.
Another significant change is that the JMSDF budget was allocated
most to personnel and provisions expenses during FY1974 through FY1979. It
was caused by the cost increase driven by the so-called oil crisis. The inflation
driven by the effect of the so-called oil crisis impacted substantially on the
materials costs for shipbuilding also. As a result of the increased materials
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Figure 10
Trends in JMSDF Front-Line Expenses
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Table 3 clearly shows the effect of the oil crisis driven inflation on
the cost of shipbuilding. The cost of ships scheduled in FY1973 increased by
30%-60% from the original cost. These additional expenses were paid from the
construction fund that was supposed to have been spent for a DE and a SS
scheduled for FY1974.

















DDG ASAKAZE 3,850 22,968,064 30,136,794 7,168,730 31.2
DE NOSHIRO 1,500 5,101,807 8,131,297 3,029,490 59.4
SS YAESHIO 1,850 9,808,169 15,232,172 5,424,003 55.3
1974
DD YUGUMO 2,150 11,610,697 12,987,931 1,377,234 11.9
DE 6,117,329 -6,117,329 -100.0
SS 11,037,005 -11,037,005 -100.0
Source: Kaijojieitai Yoyan Jimuteiyo (Kaijobakuryokanbu)
C. SHIP AND AIRCRAFT EXPANSION IN THE JMSDF
1. Ship Expansion
From observing ship construction over 30 years in the JMSDF, new
ship types have been created every 7 to 10 years on average (see Table 4). The
ship expansion pace has been substantially fast. Needless to say, new ship
types bring increased costs.
Figure 11 shows trends in shipbuilding costs for the different types
of ships (Escort Vessel : DE, Destroyer : DD, Guided Missile Destroyer : DDG,
Submarine : SS)(see Appendices K and L). In every type the real building cost
per ship increased substantially. For example, in DE the real building cost of
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Note: These charts are expressed in real Yens, based on FY 1985 prices and a 1985 deflator.
Figure 1
1
Trend of Shipbuilding Cost (by Ship type)
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ASAGIRI's cost is 4 times of YAMAGUMO's, in DDG, the KONGO'S cost is 8 times of
AMATSUKAZE's, in SS, the HARUSHIO's cost is 4.8 times of HAYASHIO's (see
Appendix M).
In terms of the real building cost per ship per standard displacement
ton, we can see an ascendant trend like in the real building cost per ship (see
Figure 12). We also notice that there is a big difference in the real building
cost per ship per standard displacement ton between CHIKUGO and ISHIKARI in
DE, between TAKATSUKI and HATAUKI in DD, between TACHIKAZE and
HATAKAZE in DDG, and between UZUSHIO and YUSHIO in SS. This big
difference means significant qualitative improvement in ship's system
performance. In fact, there were introductions of computerized systems
which control and access much tactical information and also gas turbines for
main propulsion machinery. In addition, the JMSDF is starting to equip missile
weapon systems on all new ships. This ship modernization with high
technology started in the late 1970's. Ship modernization with highly efficient
systems had an impact on the real ship building costs. As a result, the real
ship building costs rose suddenly.
2. Aircraft Expansion
In the JMSDF almost all combat aircraft are Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) aircraft. From Figure 13 (also see Appendix N), we can see clearly the
trend of ASW aircraft inventories over 30 years in the JMSDF. New type
aircraft have been acquired about every 12 years in both fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters. There were sudden increases of the real costs between HSS-2
and HSS-2B in helicopters and between P-2J and P-3C in fixed-wing aircraft.
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Note: 1. Yen/Ton in these charts are expressed in Yens, based on FY198:> prices and using a FY 1985 deflator.
2. Line graph is measured by the right-hand scale.
Figure 12
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Trend of ASW Aircraft Inventories
HSS-2 HSS-2B SH-60J P2V-7 P-2J P-3C
(1962) (1979) (1988) (1962) (1967) (1978)
Helicopter Fixed Wing
Note : (Number) is the fiscal year when the aircraft was procured.
This chart is expressed in real Yens, based on FY1985 prices and a FY1985 deflator.
Figure 14
Aircraft Cost Trend (by Type)
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P-2J cost (see Figure 14 and Appendix O). P-3C's are equipped with
computerized systems that can deal with a lot of collected tactical information
in a short time. HSS-2B's are equipped with enhanced capabilities to manage
information, such as the tactical data display system. This sudden rise of the
real aircraft procurement cost also means an enhancement of capability and
performance. Acquisitons of P-3C's and HSS-2B's began in the late 1970's.
3. Further Observations in Ship Expansion
As seen above, expansion of ships and aircraft with computer
systems and enhanced capability and performance equipment has been
promoted strongly since the late 1970's when the 4th Defense Buildup Plan was
completed and the National Defense Program Outline was formulated. It is true
that this expansion resulted in increased real procurement costs. We can,
however, find different significant aspects by looking further at the
expansion of ships and aircraft.
I examined the trend of the ratio of shipbuilding cost per ton to GNP
shown. In DE: the ratio declines from KITAKAMI of 6.88/100million (expressed
below as 6.88 instead of 6.88/100million) to ISHIKARI of 4.99 and to ABUKUMA
of 3.58; in DD: from YMAGUMO of 6.87 to HATSUYUKI of 5.23 and to ASAGIRI of
4.08; in DDG: from AMATSUKAZE of 7.90 to HATAKAZE of 5.11 and to KONGO of
4.48; and in SS: NATSUSHIO of 13.7 to UZUSHIO of 7.23 and to HAMASfflO of 5.25.
Figure 15 shows the trends of displacement (Tons) built per year
(Tons/Year), real building cost (FY 1985) per year (RealCost/Year), and the
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(1967-71) (1972-76) (1977-79) (1980-82) (i 983-85) (1986-90)
Note:DBP:Defense Buildup Plan; MTDPE: Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate;
MTDP: Mid-Term Defense Program
Figure 15
Trends in Shipbuilding (by 3 Indicators)
The result of a decline of the ratio of a shipbuilding cost per ton to
GNP in each ship type, caused no expansion of the ratio of Cost/Year/GNP in
each defense program. The ratio of Cost/Year/GNP in the 3rd Defense Buildup
Plan (DBP) is almost the same as that in the Mid-Term Defense Program
(MTDP). On the other hand, Tons/Year increased from 11,000 in 3rd DBP to
14,700 in MTDP and RealCost/Year also increased from 60 billion in 3rd DBP to
154 billion in MTDP. These increasing rates are 1.34 times in Tons/Year and
2.57 times in Real Cost/Year (see Appendix P). This means that the JMSDF could
increase the amount of ships by almost the same cost to GNP, in spite of
substantially increasing real shipbuilding costs.
In the past Japan's Defense Budget was allocated by about 1 percent
of GNP and on average GNP has increased by 4.3% each year for the last 20
years (see Appendix Q). Under this situation, the JMSDF could have financial
23
resources to increase its number of ships and aircraft without causing
financial difficulty.
As seen in Figure 16, the number of ships (Surface ships and
Submarines) has remained constant at about 70 ships for the last 30 years. On
the other hand the JMSDF's budget has increased. Since this means that extra
money was spent on the same number of ships, displacement per ship was
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Figure 16
JMSDF Budget and Ship Inventories
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D. FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO IMPROVE JMSDF
Assuming the Defense Budget will be allocated around 1 percent of GNP
and GNP will continue to increase as it has in the past, JMSDF will have a
potential capability to enhance its number of ships without financial
difficulty.
When we take into account domestic issues and international situations
at the present and in the future, we must say the assumption above is fairly
optimistic. At first the average real growth rate of the Japanese economy in
the future might be lower than that of the past5 . "The next ten years will be a
critical period for Japan, which must begin considering how to provide for its
aging society. If Japan does not invest in societal infrastructure during this
period, when saving rates are high and its population active, it will not be able
to insure that people continue to enjoy a quality of life similar to that of
Europe and the United States." 6 The priority of budget allocation will tend to
shift to Social Welfare and Public Works.
Figure 17 shows real shipbuilding costs (FY1985) per ton for DE, DD, and
SS. We can categorize two groups by before FY1974 and after FY1975. As I
stated before, DE ISHIKARI, DD HATSUYUKI, and SS USHIO are ships equipped
with highly computerized equipment, missile weapon systems, and gas turbine
machinery (except SS). Ships after FY1975 are, so-called, New-Type-Ships and
ships before FY1974 are, so-called, Conventional-Type-Ships. From Figure 17,
we can see that real costs will rise substantially when the ships equipped with
^The Japanese new economic plan (formulated by the Economic
Deliberation Committee in January 1992) set average real growth rate target at
3.5%.
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Fiscal Year
Note : The shipbuilding costs are expressed in real Yens based on FY1985 prices and using a Fy1985
deflator
Figure 17
Trends in Shipbuilding Cost/Ton
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highly advanced technological systems are constructed. In the past the JMSDF
had enough financial resources to cover the increased costs introduced by
advanced technological systems.
In addition the end of the Cold War will not lead Japan to enhance
military forces over its current levels and will likely cause defense
expenditures to be cut.
When we focus on the future of the JMSDF taking the above factors into
consideration, the JMSDF is likely to have less financial resources to enhance
its current force level.
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III. COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE JMSDF AND THE U.S. NAVY
A. BALANCED NAVY CONCEPT
"...From the Sea", which is the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps White Paper
published in September 1992 by the Department of the Navy of the U.S., stated
the following about Naval Forces and Naval organizations. "As Naval Forces
shift from a Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional,
littoral, and expeditionary focus, Naval organizations will change. Responding
to crises in the future will require great flexibility and new ways to employ
our forces." Naval Force Packages will consist of the following different types
of ships and aircraft:
Aircraft carriers and air wings
Amphibious ships with embarked Marines
Surface combatants




I f we follow the U.S. Naval strategy, the balanced Navy concept continues
to be relevant in the future even though the U.S. Naval Forces shift from "a
Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and
expeditionary focus". Therefore I will compare Naval Forces among different
countries based on the balanced Navy concept. When we measure relative
levels of certain country's naval capabilities to accomplish its mission! s), this
concept is one way to compare fleet composition of certain country's navies
with that of other countries' navies. It can be allowed to categorize fleet
composition into Aircraft Carriers (CV), Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN),
other Submarines (SS), Cruisers, Destroyers (DD) and Frigates (FF), Mine
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Warfare Ships (M/W), Amphibious Warfare Ships (A/W), and others. Both CVs
and SSBNs have strategic missions.
B. COMPARISON OF FLEET COMPOSITION
Figures 18 and 19 show fleet compositions with numbers of ships and
displacement (full load tons) in natural logarithms respectively in light of the
above categories (see Appendices R, S, and T). These include fleet
compositions of the entire U.S Navy, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Russian Navy7
,
Russian
Pacific Fleet, French Navy, U.K. Navy, and the JMSDF.
In terms of number of ships from Figure 18, we can say the following:
the U.S. Pacific Fleet is approximately one half of the entire U.S. Navy. The
number of SSBNs and SSs in the U.S. Pacific Fleet is, however, one-third of the
entire U.S. Navy. Two-thirds of the entire SSBNs and SSs of the U.S. are
deployed in the Atlantic Fleet. It shows the U.S. sets the priority of deterrent
by SSBNs on the Atlantic Ocean rather than on the Pacific Ocean because the
Atlantic Ocean faces NATO allies and Russia. In addition, Mine Warfare Forces
of the U.S. Navy are relatively smaller not only than other component forces
but also that of the Russian Navy. The U.S. does not deploy diesel submarines.
The reason is that the U.S. Navy has emphasized offensive capabilities. The
Russian Pacific Fleet makes up one-third of the entire Russian Navy. The
French Navy, the U.K. Navy, and the JMSDF take similar shapes. But it's hard to
say that this is an appropriate way to measure fleet capabilities, because this
7In this thesis, I will use "Russia" as the word meaning the former
U.S.S.R.. In "Military Balance 1992-1993" (The International Institute for
Strategic Studies), the word "Russia" is used instead of former U.S.S.R.. Also in
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figure considers the capability of one ship as the same as that of any other
ship regardless of its size.
Figure 19, which deals with fleet composition with displacement (full load
ton) in natural logarithm, is better than Figure 17 in measuring fleet
capability as a whole8 . Because ship displacement is a good cost driver of
shipbuilding, there is a high positive correlation between ship displacement
and shipbuilding cost. As seen in different types of ships such as the CV, DD,
SSBN, SS, etc., the greater the capability of the ship is, the higher the
shipbuilding cost.
From Figure 19, we can see obviously that all the Fleets I listed above
except the JMSDF have well balanced fleet compositions and capabilities and
the JMSDF looks rather unique in its fleet composition in comparison to the
other countries.
With respect to the JMSDF from Figures 18 and 19, many destroyers and
mine-sweeping ships are the main feature of the JMSDF' s physical ship assets.
The JMSDF lacks strategic capability against other countries. Nowadays the
JMSDF's destroyers are equipped with anti-air missile systems. These missile
systems have difficulties dealing with many targets at the same time because
of the limitations of their tracking radars. Therefore from these figures we
can also see that the JMSDF has a drawback of no air cover to protect its ships
on sea in areas beyond air cover offered by the fighters of the Japan Air Self-
Defense Force (JASDF).
8There is another way to measure fleet composition by inventory value
that may be the best measure. We have not, however, employed this inventory
value measure, which is the dollar value of the different class of ships known,
because of the difficulties in comparing different currencies.
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C. COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT ASSETS
Figure 20 is my attempt to show the aircraft asset composition each navy
has. I tried categorizing navy combat aircraft into Bomber (BBR) and Fighter
(FTR), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft and Maritime Reconnaissance
(MR) aircraft, Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft, Airborne Early Warning
(AEW) aircraft, Commando (CDO) aircraft, and Mine Countermeasure (MCM)
aircraft. In the case of aircraft, unlike ships, it will be allowed to consider the
capability of one aircraft type as equivalent to other aircraft types even
though they have different missions. Therefore I measure aircraft force
capability by the number of aircraft in each category.
From Figure 20, although shapes of fleet composition of French Navy, U.K.
Navy, and JMSDF took similar shape, in the case of aircraft, they have
substantially different aircraft asset compositions. The U.K. has greater
aircraft capabilities than France. Major features of the JMSDF are ASW, MR,
and MCM aircraft. From Table 5, we can see the qualitative aspects of each
countries' aircraft inventories. Figure 21, which shows the totals of land-
based ASW maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in NATO and Japanese forces, also
reinforces the JMSDF's ASW feature. Japan has about 14 percent of the total
MPA aircraft.
D. CONSISTENCE WITH JAPANESE AUTHORITY
As stated above, many destroyers, mine-sweeping ships, many ASW and
MR aircraft, and MCM aircraft are major features of the JMSDF's physical
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TABLE 5 Contents of Aircraft Assets




























CRUSADER 12 SEA HARRIER 40







MR P-3B/C 209 TU-22 5 ATLANTIC 24 P-3C 66
SU-24 12 ATRANTIQUE 6 P-2J 10
AN-12 8 GARDIAN 5
II-20 2
EW EA-6B 109 TU-95 24 EP-2J 2




TRG F/A-18-B 27 ETENDARD 10 SEA HARRIER 5 KM-2 30
F/A-18-D 92 AUZE 8 JETSTREAM 19 P-X 10
F-5E/F/T-38 40 ZEPHYR 14 CHIPMUNK 14 QUEEN AIR 65 22
F-16-N 22 NORD 262 15 T-5 8
TF-16N 4 NAVAJO 2 TC-90/UC-90 23
A-4E/F 59 XINGU 11 YS-11T 10
TA-4F/J 194 RALLYE880 4
TE:2B 10 MS-760 8





MISC 98 59 56 34 22
HELICOPTERS:
ASW SH-60B 137 MH4 69 LYNX 35 SEA KING 51 HSS-2A/B 81
SH-60F 60 KA-25 85 SA-321 12 LYNX 77











AEW SEA KING 10
COMMANDO KA-27 25 SEA KING 34
TRG CH-46 231 SA-313 4 SEA KING 25 HSS-2A/B 10
SA-316/-319 15 GAZELLE HT-2/-3 26 OH-6D/J 12
MISC 16 17 35 4


















Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,
(U.S. Secretary of Defense)
P2-34
Figure 21
ASW Aircraft (in 1988) Total NATO and Japan
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We can easily see this authority in the "National Defense Program
Outline" (NDPO). The following refers to the posture of the JMSDF in the NDPO.
1. The JMSDF must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile operating
ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action and such situations
at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to maintain at least one escort flotilla
on alert at all times.
2. The JMSDF must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal surveillance
and defense, surface anti-submarine capability of at least one ship division in
operational readiness at all times in each assigned sea district.
3. The JMSDF must maintain submarine units, anti-submarine
helicopter units and minesweeping units, providing the capability for
surveillance and defense missions as well as minesweeping at important
harbors and major straits when such necessity arises.
4. The JMSDF must maintain fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft units
in order to provide the capability of carrying out missions of surveillance and
patrol of the nearby seas and ship protection.
Descriptions of the actual scales of organizations and primary equipment
under the foregoing concepts are given in its attachment (see Table 6).
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TABLE 6 Inventory Level in JMSDF by NDPO
Basic Units
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units
(for mobile operations) 4 Escort Flotillas
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units
(Regional District Units) 10 Divisions
Submarine Units 6 Divisions
Minesweeping Units 2 Flotillas
Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units 16 Squadrons
Main EauiDment
Anti-submarine Surface Ships Approx. 60 Ships
Submarines 16 Submarines
Combat Aircraft Approx. 220 Aircraft
Here we can see that the features of the JMSDF's physical assets are
consistent with the contents of the NDPO.
E. COMPLEMENTARY TO THE JMSDF
I assume here again that the entire function of the navy is measured both
by the level of fleet composition categorized into CV, SSBN, SS (less SSBN),
Cruisers, DD and FF, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Warfare Ships, and
others, and by the number of navy combat aircraft categorized into BBR and
Fighter, ASW Aircraft and MR aircraft, EW aircraft, AEW aircraft, CDO aircraft,
and MCM aircraft.
Figure 22 shows some combinations between the JMSDF and some parts of
the U.S. Navy in fleet composition (also see Appendix U). I consider U.S. Navy
ships homeported in Japan and one-third of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as some parts
of the U.S. Navy. Because they seem to be considered as the marine force
•40
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together with the JMSDF which influence sea control in the East Asian Pacific
sea area around the island of Japan. It is based on my assumption that
approximately one-third of the U.S. Pacific Fleet may be viewed for this
purpose.
A cruiser-destroyer-frigate group and an amphibious group of the U.S.
Navy are homeported in Japan, as is one aircraft carrier. One aircraft carrier,
two cruisers, three destroyers, three frigates, and six amphibious warfare
ships are homeported in Japan at present. A combined maritime force
between the JMSDF fleet and the U.S. ships homeported in Japan will have a
better balanced fleet composition and capability than the JMSDF does by itself.
That combined maritime force still lacks SSBN capabilities. Because Japan
adheres to the "Three Non-nuclear Principals" as national policy, it is not
expected for an SSBN to homeported in Japan. When U.S. ships homeported in
Japan conduct operations together with the JMSDF, the U.S. ships supplement
the missing air cover function of the JMSDF.
Next, a combined maritime force between the JMSDF and the U.S. Seventh
Fleet will have a fleet composition like Figure 22. This maritime force has a
completely well-balanced fleet composition. In terms of fleet composition, the
U.S. Seventh Fleet is complementary to the JMSDF.
This result is consistent with the concept of maritime operations
described in the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation."" The
following outlines its concept: when an armed attack against Japan takes
place, the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy will jointly conduct maritime operations
^This is the report by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation,
submitted to and approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee.
42
for the defense of surrounding waters and the protection of sea lanes of
communication. The JMSDF will primarily conduct operations for the
protection of major ports and straits in Japan; and anti-submarine operations,
operations for the protection of ships and other operations in the surrounding
waters. U.S. Navy Forces will support JMSDF operations and conduct operations,
including those which may involve the use of task forces providing additional
mobility and strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces."
While it might be hard to conclude that the JMSDF or Japan is
complementary to the U.S. Navy and its physical assets, at least the following
can be stated. With the physical assets the JMSDF has, it is obvious that the
JMSDF can't perform as many maritime missions as the U.S. Navy. But the
JMSDF can conduct substantial anti-submarine warfare operations in the sea
area around Japan by using many highly efficient anti-submarine surface
ships and anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft. Needless to say, this JMSDF
effort not only contributes to Japan's security directly, but also enhances the
U.S. Navy's capability in the far east region. Because the Seventh Fleet has a
vast area of responsibility, from the Kamchatka Peninsula of Russia to the
Persian Gulf, if her burden around Japan is released by the JMSDF' s effort, she
can shift her assets to other areas.
F. U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
The U.S. maritime doctrine or strategic concept is driven by the National
Military Strategy of the U.S. which is effected by the U.S. president's National
Security Strategy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has meant
that the East-West confrontation that had keynoted the world military situation
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for over 40 years has come to an end. Needless to say, this great change has
forced a change in the U.S. National Security Strategy. A new U.S. National
Security Strategy was announced in August 1991.
A few months later, in January 1992, the National Military Strategy of the
U.S. was published. At the beginning of this strategy, it is stated that "Most
significant is the shift from containing the spread of communism and
deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is
regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to the challenges of
this decade." 10 This strategy is built upon the four foundations of Strategic
Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and
Reconstitution.il This strategy also states that the U.S. will deter and defend
against strategic nuclear attacks as the U.S. has for the past forty years and
also project a forward presence and provide crisis responses as fundamental
parts of its regionally oriented strategy.
The U.S. remains an Asia-Pacific power with interests in East Asia. The
U.S. Department of Defense has stated, "Despite the decade of change that we
foresee, our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have
pursued in the past. With a total two-way transpacific trade exceeding 300
billion dollars annually, 50 percent more than our transatlantic trade, it is in
our own best interest to help preserve peace and stability. The principal
elements of our Asian strategy — forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and
bilateral security arrangements — will remain valid and essential to
l^The National Military Strategy of the United States (Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff) PI
U-The National Military Strategy of the United States (Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff) P6
44
maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S.
interests." 12 U.S. interests in this region require a continuing commitment.
Therefore forward presence forces in this region are essential to the U.S.
Military Strategy. "Forward presence forces will be principally maritime. The
U.S. plans to keep one aircraft carrier battle group and an amphibious ready
group homeported in Japan and has developed new forward options not
dependent upon U.S.'s former bases in the Philippines."^
G. COMPLEMENTARY TO THE U.S. NAVY
As seen in the new U.S. Military strategy, in spite of the great changes in
the international situation, forward presence still remains as one of the four
foundations of new U.S. Military strategy. This is because of the U.S.
perception that over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces
in regions vital to U.S. national interests has been key to averring crises and
preventing war. "In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward
presence includes periodic and rational deployments, access and storage
agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port
visits, and rnihtary-to-niilitary contacts. ^
By considering this U.S. Military strategy, we can conclude that Japan or
the JMSDF is complementary to U.S. Navy strategy. Japan provides bases and
facilities and capabilities which accommodate CVs. "It is in the U.S. interest to
12A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim; Looking Toward the
21st Century (Department of Defense, 1990) P8
l^The National Military Strategy of the United States (Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff) P22
14The National Military Strategy of the United States (Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff) P7
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maintain a forward deployed presence in Japan over the long-term for two
reasons: the geostrategic location of bases and the cost effectiveness of U.S.
presence compared to anywhere else." 15
Therefore Japan contributes to the U.S.'s Forward presence.
H. COOPERATION IN NAVAL ACTIVITIES
It is important to understand the level of cooperative activities between
the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy. From the U.S. perspective, cooperation is part of
the U.S. extending a forward presence. It serves to promote better mutual
understanding and close communications. As a result, it also serves to
upgrade interoperability between forces. Therefore regular combined
training and other types of cooperative activities are indispensable to ensure
smooth cooperation of JMSDF-U.S. Navy actions in the event of any
emergencies involving Japan.
The JMSDF has been involved in the following Japan-U.S. combined
training activities (also see Table 7):
1. RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) EXERCISE is a comprehensive exercise
projected by the U.S. 3rd Fleet and is conducted every other year in the eastern
Pacific Ocean. Ships of foreign countries, such as Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, participate in this exercise. The JMSDF took part in RIMPAC in 1980
for the first time and has participated in every exercise since then. Eight DD's
(Destroyer), one AOE (Fast Combat Support Ship), and eight P-3C's out of the
JMSDF took part in RIMPAC '90.
15A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim; Looking Toward the
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2. A JMSDF-U.S. Navy Combined Exercise is conducted in the sea area
from Hawaii to California every other year when the RIMPAC exercise is not
conducted. Three DD's and five P-3C's out of the JMSDF take part in this
exercise.
3. Special Anti-Submarine Warfare Training is conducted several times
each year in the sea area around Japan between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy.
4. Special Mine-Sweeping Training is conducted yearly.
5. The JMSDF Annual Exercise is the biggest exercise in which almost
all ships, aircraft, and personnel in the JMSDF are involved. As a part of this
exercise, JMSDF-U.S. Navy combined training is conducted. A U.S. Navy
aircraft carrier usually takes part in this exercise.
6. The first Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise was conducted
in 1989 at the U.S. Naval War College and has been conducted yearly since
then.
I. LEVEL OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND FUTURE TRENDS
It has been found that there is a high level of complementarity between
the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy either in terms of fleet composition, military
strategy, or cooperation in naval activities. Japan's complementary
relationship with the U.S. will most likely continue in the future. Assuming
that this complementary relationship continues, as I examined in Section II
the JMSDF will probably not have sufficient financial resources in the future
to enhance its naval forces over the current levels. However, if the
complementary relationship with the U.S. continues, Japan will not need a
balanced maritime force. It is also anticipated that Japan will continue to
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maintain a defensive strategy and improve its current complementary
relationship with the U.S..
On the other hand, the U.S. Navy considers that U.S. Navy forces can
operate with other elements of joint or combined task forces, including allied
forces and assets in order to respond to U.S. national needs. Also the U.S. itself
may not prefer that Japan enhance its military beyond its current force level.
The Department of Defense in the U.S. stated that "Increases in Japanese
military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in
the region could prove worrisome to regional nations, especially if they
perceive Japan is acting independent of the U.S.-Japan security
relationship." 1" The U.S. stresses "the importance of maintaining
interoperability in our military weapons systems by encouraging maximum
procurement from the U.S., increasing technology flowback, and discouraging
the development of non-complementary systems."^ Also in November 1991,
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Richard Cheney, unveiled
complementary defense cooperation as one principle of U.S. strategy for East
Asia.
Taking into account the above factors, there is little likelihood for the
JMSDF to take a separate path from the current complementary relationship
with the U.S. Navy.
1"A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the
21st Century (Department of Defense, 1990) P6
1?a Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the
21st Century (Department of Defense, 1990) P18
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VI. CONCLUSION
As I stated at the outset, one of the primary research questions was "Does
the JMSDF have the financial resources to improve its forces in the future?"
Another question was "What has been and will be the level of complementarity
between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy?" For the first question, throughout
Section II we find that if about 1 percent of GNP will be allocated to the JMSDF
budget and GNP will continue to increase as in the past, and assuming that the
total number of major ships is fixed like the current situation, it might be
possible for the JMSDF to make larger and more modern ships without serious
financial problems. When we take into account, however, the coming aging
society and other social welfare issues, the JMSDF budget may not be allocated
the same as it has in the past. The average real growth rate of the Japanese
economy in the future might be lower than that of the past. The introduction
of advanced technological systems to ships and/or aircraft will require
substantive additional costs. This leads me to conclude that the JMSDF is not
likely to be allocated enough financial resources to enhance its inventory
much beyond its current force level. This situation tends to lead Japan to
continue on a complementary relationship with the U.S..
With respect to the second question, the examination reveals that there is
a high level of complementarity overall between the JMSDF and the U.S.
Pacific Fleet. This relationship will most likely continue in the future.
Therefore it is concluded that the future direction of the JMSDF will be




BASIC POLICY FOR JAPAN'S NATIONAL DEFENSE
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect
aggression, but once invaded, to repel such action, thereby preserving the
independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.
To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby establishes
the following principles:
1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote
international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world
peace.
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the
country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary
for self-defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing
domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United
Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.
Source : Defense of Japan (Defense Agency, Japan)
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APPENDIX B
BRIEF ON JAPAN'S DEFENSE PROGRAMS POLICIES
1. First Defense Buildup Plan(FY1958-1960)
-Constructing a fundamental ground defense capability in order to cope
with the rapid reductions in U.S. ground forces stationed in Japan
-Establishing maritime and air defense capability
3. Second Defense Buildup Plan(FY1962-1966)
-Strengthening that defense potential to the point of capability in
meeting conventional aggression on a scale no greater than localized conflict
3. Third Defense Buildup Plan(FY1967-1971)
-Consolidation of the most effective defense potential capable of
meeting conventional aggression on a scale no greater than localized conflict
4. Fourth Defense Buildup Plan(FY 1972-1976)
-Following up the third plan
5. Mid-Term Defense Program(FY1986-1990)
-to attain the level of defense capability laid down in the National
Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
-to upgrade the defense capability enough to match the international
military situation and trends in the technological gains of other countries
-the furtherance of systematically coordinated relations among the
three self-defense forces and the demonstration of joint operational effects
6. New Mid-Term Defense Program (FY199 1-1995)
-to maintain efficiently the level of defense capability laid down in the
NDPO
-to maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements
-to maintain a well-balanced posture in all dimensions
Source : Defense of Japan (Defense Agency, Japan)
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APPENDIX C
OUTLINE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUILDUP FOR THE FUTURE
1. First of all, Japan will stick steadfastly to its exclusive defense policy
under the peace constitution. At the same time, Japan, holding fast to the
Japan-U.S. Security arrangements, will continue maintaining the basic
defense policy it has pursued over the past years, including the moderate
improvement of its defense capability.
2. The defense-related expenditure for each fiscal year during the
enforcement period of the Mid-Term Defense Program is decided within the
framework of required expenses set forth in this program. And the total
amount of expenses is set as the actual ceiling of defense expenditure for the
five years of the program that was scheduled to be prepared anew three years
henceforth.
3. As regards defense-related expenditures in and after fiscal 1991, it will
be decided- by the time the Mid-Term Defense Program is completed, in
accordance with Japan's basic policy as a peace-loving nation by taking into
consideration factors such as the international situation, and economic and
fiscal situations.
4. Furthermore, considering that the decision on "Defense Buildup for the
Time Being" in 1976 has so far played a vital role as a guideline for the defense
buildup expenses, the government, with this well in mind, will continue
holding in high esteem the spirit of the decision calling for a moderate
defense buildup.
Source: Summary of Defense of Japan 1988 (Defense Agency, Japan) P89
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APPENDIX D
CHANGES IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
(Unit! 00 million Yen, %)
FY 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Defence (DE) 1,485 1,560 1,569 1.803 2.085 2.412 2.751 3.014
GNP 102,470 107,620 1 27,480 156.200 1 76,700 203.900 240.700 281.600
BUDGET 13.121 14,192 15.697 19,528 24.268 28.500 32.554 36,581
Ratio(%)
(1)DE/GNP 1.45% 1.45% 1.23% 1.15% 1.18% 1.18% 1.14% 1.07%
(2)DE/BUDGET 11.32% 10.99% 10.00% 9.23% 8.59% 8.46% 8.45% 8.24%
FY 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Defence (DE) 3.407 3,809 4.221 4.838 5.695 6,709 8.003 9.355
GNP 308.500 409.500 478.400 578.600 724.400 843.200 905.500 1,098.000
BUDGET 43,143 49,509 58.185 67.395 79.497 94.143 114.677 142.841
Ratio(%)
(DDE/GNP 1.10% 0.93% 0.88% 0.84% 0.79% 0.80% 0.88% 0.85%
(2)DE/BUDGET 7.90% 7.69% 7.25% 7.18% 7.16% 7.13% 6.98% 6.55%
FY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Defence (DE) 10,930 13,273 15,124 1 6,906 19,010 20.945 22.302 24.000
GNP 1,315,000 1.585,000 1,681,000 1,928,500 2.106,000 2,320,000 2,478,000 2,648,000
(2)DE/BUDGET 1 70,994 212,888 242,960 285,143 342,950 386,001 425,888 467,881
Ratio(%)
(DDE/GNP 0.83% 0.84% 0.90% 0.88% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.91%
(2)DE/BUDGET 6.39% 6.23% 6.22% 5.93% 5.54% 5.43% 5.24% 5.13%
FY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Defence (DE) 25,861 27.542 29,346 31,371 33.435 35,174 37,003 39,198
GNP 2.772,000 2.817.000 2.960,000 3,146,000 3. 367. 000 3.504,000 3,652.000 3,897,000
BUDGET 496.808 503.796 506,272 524.996 540.886 541.010 566.997 604.142
Ratio(%)
(DDE/GNP 0.93% 0.98% 0.99% 0.997% 0.993% 1.004% 1.013% 1.006%
(2)DE/BUDGET 5.21% 5.47% 5.80% 5.98% 6.18% 6.50% 6.53% 6.49%
FY 1990 1991 1992
Defence (DE) 41.593 43.860 45,518
GNP 4.172.000 4.596.000 4.837.000
BUDGET 662.368 703.474 722,180
Ratio(%)
(DDE/GNP 0.997% 0.954% 0.941%
(2)DE/BUDGET 6.28% 6.23% 6.30%
Source: Boei Handbook (Asagumo Shinbunsha) P228-230
note; 1 . BUDGET is shown by Original Budget.
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FY1961 KITAKAMI 7,420,057 4,980 6.88E-08
1967 CHIKUGO 7,955,372 5,412 4.72E-08
1977 ISHIKARI 14,068,471 1 0,906 4.99E-08
1979 YUBARI 16,396,047 11,154 4.59E-08
1986 ABUKUMA 23,609,808 11,805 3.58E-08
DD
FY1962 YAMAGUMO 10,110,612 4,932 6.87E-08
1963 TAKATSUKI 14,242,918 4,594 5.82E-08
1977 HATSUYUKI 32,894,496 11,151 5.23E-08
1983 ASAGIRI 40,359,168 11,531 4.08E-08
DDG
FY1960 AMATSUKAZE 14,215,567 4,661 7.90E-08
1971 TACHIKAZE 31,198,660 8,104 5.80E-08
1981 HATAKAZE 62,670,571 13,624 5.11E-08
1988 GONGO 113,380,204 15,747 4.48E-08
SS
FY1960 HAYASHIO 6,674,718 8,449 1 .37E-07
1963 OSHIO 12,367,682 7,496 9.40E-08
1967 UZUSHIO 15,479,852 8,367 7.23E-08
1975 YUSHIO 28,987,971 13,176 7.08E-08
1986 HAMASHIO 31,724,905 14,100 5.25E-08
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1961 199,000 * 735,610 *
1962 217,000 * 792,252 *
1963 256,000 * 872,270 *
1964 297,000 * 958,625 *
1965 336,730 1,027,023
1966 395,000 * 1,138,294 *

























Source: Enonomic Planning Agency (Except *)
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(Number of Ships in Natural Log.)
U.S Pacific
RUSSIA
(Number of Ships : in Log)
CV
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(Number of Ships : in Log)
CV
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FLEET COMPOSITION (Full Load Ton)
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U.S. Ships homeprted in JAPAN




JAPAN + 1/3*(U.S. Pacific)
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